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GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
SECURITIES DEALERS
INTRODUCTION

In 1939, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) was
established1 as the self-regulatory organization for the over-the-counter (OTC)
securities industry. 2 Since that time, the NASD has shared many of the same
law enforcement responsibilities that Congress delegated to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). 3 In accordance with these responsibilities the
NASD often investigates and disciplines its members for improper conduct in
their dealings with the investing public.'
The role that the NASD plays raises the question of whether in some
respects it is a governmental actor for constitutional purposes. Two issues are
presented: first, whether arbitrary and capricious acts by NASD officials are
a violation of an individual's substantive due process rights;s and, second,
whether the fruits of a warrantless search conducted by an NASD member
and turned over to the NASD
at its request are subject to the fourth
6
amendment's exclusionary rule.
Courts dealing with the issue of whether activities of the NASD should be
treated as governmental have reached opposite conclusions. Recently, in
United States v. Bloom, 7 the court held that the NASD was not a governmen1. See Application of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 627
(1939).
2. The OTC securities industry consists of brokers and dealers engaging in securities
transactions off the stock exchanges. S. Jaffe, Broker-Dealers and Securities Markets 207 (1977).
OTC trading is less centralized than trading on an exchange, which is concentrated in a central
marketplace. Securities and Exchange Commission, Report of the Special Study of Securities
Markets (pt. 4), H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Special
Study). Since 1971, however, the OTC markets' somewhat diffuse and heterogeneous nature has
been improved by the National Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ), which utilizes computer equipment to centralize the listing of OTC quotations. S. Jaffe, supra, at 212-13.
3. See pt. I(C) infra.
4. See notes 79-86 infra and accompanying text.
5. Defendants in United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1978), argued that a
criminal indictment against them should be dismissed because of alleged "government misconduct" on the part of the SEC and the NASD. Id. at 329. Government misconduct that violates an
individual's substantive due process rights may result in a criminal indictment being dismissed or
its tainted portions stricken. United States v. Fields, [1978 Transfer Binder) Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH)
96,552 (2d Cir. Sept. 14, 1978) (dismissal of an indictment is justified in certain
circumstances); see, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976) (indictment
dismissed because United States Attorney did not advise grand jury witness that he was target of
an investigation, when it was a practice to do so), cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978); United
States v. Rodman, 519 F.2d 1058 (1st Cir. 1975) (indictment dismissed when SEC broke its
promise to recommend that defendant not be prosecuted in return for his information). Substantive due process has never been precisely defined. "Due process of law, as a historic and
generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby confining, these standards of conduct more
precisely than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by methods that offend 'a sense of
justice.' " Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.
278, 286 (1936)); accord, United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977).
6. See note 139 infra.
7. 450 F. Supp. 323, 330 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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tal actor and that its actions and those of its officials could not violate the fifth
amendment's guarantee of due process of law 8 or the fourth amendment's
protection against unreasonable search and seizure. 9 Conversely, in Harwell
v. Growth Programs, Inc.,10 the court found that Congress had empowered
the NASD to act as a quasi-governmental agency with broad securities law
enforcement responsibilities, and, therefore, held that the NASD was a governmental actor.'
This Note will argue that the NASD acts in a governmental manner and,
therefore, is subject to the requirements of substantive due process and the
fourth amendment. Part I will outline the background and history of the
NASD. Part II will examine the functions of the NASD and its relationship
with the SEC to determine whether the NASD satisfies the Supreme Court's
tests for governmental action. Finally, Part III will analyze the applicability
of the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule to certain types of private
searches conducted by NASD members.
I.

NASD-BACKG ROUND

The Securities Exchange Act of 193412 places primary responsibility for
regulation of the securities markets with the SEC.' 3 The framers of the 1934
Act realized, however, that the federal government lacked the expertise and
capabilities to oversee every aspect of the securities markets. 14 Therefore, the
Act imposes self-regulatory responsibilities on the stock exchanges with respect to listed securities.' 5 By 1938, Congress realized that the SEC alone
could not police the OTC securities industry either. 16 Rather than enlarge the
federal bureaucracy, Congress passed the .[aloney Amendment of 1938,17
which authorized the creation of national securities associations to assist the
SEC in regulating brokers and dealers' 8 in the OTC industry. 19 As then8. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No person shall be... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ." U.S. Const. amend. V.
9. The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S.
Const. amend. IV.
10. 315 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 451 F,2d 240 (Sth Cir.
1971), modified per curiam, 459 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972).

11.

Id. at 1191.

12.

15 U.S.C.

§

78a-78kk (1976).

13. See generally L. Loss, Securities Regulation 82-84 (1951).
14. Special Study, supra note 2, at 501. See generally Moylan, The Place of Self-Regulation in
the Securities Industry, 6 Sec. Reg. L.J. 49 (1978).

15.

S. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 239.

16.
17.

Special Study, supra note 2, at 604-05.
Ch. 677, 52 Stat. 1070 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1976)).

18. "Broker" is defined in the 1934 Act as "any person engaged in the business of effecting
transactions in securities for the account of others . . . ." Securities Exchange Act § 3(a)(4), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) (1976). "Dealer" is defined as "any person engaged in the business of buying
and selling securities for his own account through a broker or otherwise ..... Id. § 3(a)(5), 15
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1976).
19. S. Rep. No. 1455, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 3-5 (1938) [hereinafter cited as 1938 Senate
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Chairman of the SEC, William 0. Douglas, stated, the law was designed so
that industry would
take the lead with government "holding the shotgun
'20
behind the door."
The NASD, organized in 1939, is the only association ever formed under
the Maloney Amendment and is therefore the self-regulatory agency charged
with primary responsibility for OTC market supervision in the same manner
as the exchanges regulate the listed securities markets. 2 1 However, unlike the
stock exchanges, which were originally private associations that only later
were given self-regulatory responsibilities, the NASD is wholly a "creature of
statute. "22

The 1934 Act requires that NASD membership be open to all qualified
broker-dealers.2 3 As an inducement to joining, members are authorized 24 to
give other members preferential treatment, as to prices, commissions, and
other rates. 25 Thus, membership in the NASD is an economic necessity and
the overwhelming majority of all securities26firms in the United States dealing
in OTC securities belong to the NASD.
The 1934 Act also mandates that associations formed under the Maloney
Amendment adopt rules "designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative
27
acts and practices [and] to promote just and equitable principles of trade.1
With the approval of the SEC, 28 the NASD has promulgated Rules of Fair
Practice which set guidelines for members' activities in the conduct of their
business. 29 In order to enforce these rules, the NASD conducts member
Report]; H.R. Rep. No. 2307, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 4-5 (1938). "[Tihe NASD %%-as specifically
established to govern conduct in the over-the-counter markets." Special Study, supra note 2, at
603. Section 15A(b)(6) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1976), permits a national
securities association to register with the SEC if it has adopted rules designed to prevent stock
fraud and manipulation, promote just and equitable principles of trade, and protect investors and
the public interest.
20. 1938 Senate Report, supra note 19, at 4.
21. S. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 239.
22. Special Study, supra note 2, at 603.
23. Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(3) (1976). A broker or dealer
must be registered with the SEC and authorized to do business in any branch of the investment
banking and securities industry to qualify for NASD membership. NASD By-Laws, art. I. § 1,
reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 1101 (1973). A registered broker or dealer may be denied
membership if it is subject to a statutory disqualification. Id. art. I,§ 2, reprinted in NASD
Manual (CCH)
1102 (1973). Statutory disqualifications are enumerated in § 3(a)[39) of the
Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(39) (1976). National stock exchanges and the NASD
have the power to determine whether a person is subject to a statutory disqualification. Id.
§ 15(b)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(10) (1976).
24. Securities Exchange Act § 1SA(e)(1), (3), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(e)(1), (3) (1976).
25. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 25, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 2175
(1975); see Special Study, supra note 2, at 605.
26. Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 6S0, 681 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Current Problems];see Special Study, supra note 2, at 603. Approximately
85% of all registered broker-dealers are members of the NASD. 40 SEC Ann. Rep. 47, 56 (1974)
27. Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(6) (1976).
28. Id. § 15A(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b) (1976). In order to register with the SEC, NASD rules
must meet the specific criteria set forth in this section of the 1934 Act.
29. See NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, §§ 1-32, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH)
2151-82A (1976).
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inspections and investigations. 30 If a violation is discovered, the NASD will

file a complaint and institute disciplinary proceedings. 31 The proceedings are

conducted by the NASD's regional District Business Conduct Committee
(DBCC)32 and must comply with the NASD's own procedures, which include
provisions for notice and a hearing. 33 Any action taken by the DBCC is

appealable as of right to the NASD Board of Governors, 34 to the SEC, which
36
35
conducts a de novo review, and finally to the appropriate circuit court.

II. GOVERNMENTAL ACTION AND THE NASD
A. General Principlesof Governmental Action for ConstitutionalPurposes
Although the Constitution prohibits governmental agencies and officials
from engaging in certain activities, it "erects no shield against merely private
30. Special Study, supra note 2, at 602-08, 646-71; S. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 241-43. The
NASD may inspect the books and records of any member to determine whether it is complying
with the Rules of Fair Practice. Special Study, supra note 2, at 647-59. Another important
function of the NASD is to qualify broker-dealers and the securities salesmen they employ for
membership. Id. at 602-08, 646-71; S. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 241-43.
31. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. V, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 1 2301 (1976).
32. See generally Special Study, supra note 2, at 608-41. The NASD is managed on a national
scale by a Board of Governors, with membership divided into thirteen geographical districts,
each of which has a DBCC. Id.
33. NASD Code of Procedure for Handling Trade Practice Complaints, §§ 6, 8, reprinted in
NASD Manual (CCH)
3006, 3008 (1973). Although § 15A(h) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78o-3(b) (1976), does not specifically state that the NASD must accord procedural due process, It
requires the NASD to adopt procedures for disciplining members and their associates. These
procedures must provide for specific charges, notice, an opportunity to defend, and maintenance
of a record. Id. If the NASD sanctions a member, it must provide a statement setting forth the
challenged act or omission, the specific rule or statutory provision violated, the sanction, and the
reasons therefor. Id.
The SEC has held that the provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that prohibits a
federal agency official from acting as both prosecutor and judge in administrative disciplinary
proceedings, 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (1976), does not apply to disciplinary proceedings before the
NASD, on the ground that the NASD is not a federal agency. Sumner B. Cotzin, SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 10,850 (June 12, 1974), reprintedin [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 79,827. The Commission was careful to point out, however, that this
proscription is solely statutory and that, in its opinion, such separation of functions is not
constitutionally required in federal agency administrative proceedings. Thus, the Fifth Circuit
has held that due process was not violated when a stock exchange, which the court labeled an
administrative agency, exercised both investigative and judicial functions. Intercontinental
Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941-43 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 842 (1972). This Note is concerned only with those procedures and actions that are
constitutionally, as opposed to statutorily, proscribed.
34. NASD Code of Procedure for Handling Trade Practice Complaints, § 15, reprinted in
NASD Manual (CCH)
3014 (1973).
35. Securities Exchange Act § 19(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e) (1976). The SEC may "reduce, cancel,
or leave undisturbed the penalty imposed." Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008, 1012 (3d Cir.
1977), discussed at note 65 infra.
36. Securities Exchange Act § 25(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78y(:) (1976). For additional descriptions of
the NASD and its functions, see Special Study, supra note 2, at 602-82; Jaffe, supra note 2, at
238-69; 2 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1365-69 (2d ed. 1961); Jennings, Self-Regulation in the
Securities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 663, 675-77 (1964); White, NationalAssociation of Securities Dealers, Inc., 28 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 250 (1959); Current Problems, supra note 26.
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conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful." 3 7 Nevertheless, private conduct that can be characterized as governmental action 38 also becomes subject
to constitutional strictures. 39 The essential problem, therefore, is to distinguish between purely private conduct and governmental action. In the effort
to do so, the Supreme Court has devised no one method to cover all
situations. 40 The simplest test is to look for direct governmental participation
in the challenged action of the private entity, such as judicial enforcement of
private contractual arrangements that attempt to discriminate on the basis of
race. 4 1 When such direct action is found, there is governmental action and no
further inquiry is required. When the facts do not dearly indicate direct
governmental action, the Court has employed two other approaches. These can
be labelled the "public function" test, most recently discussed in Flagg
Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 42 and the "symbiotic relationship" test, originally
43
espoused in Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority.
The Supreme Court developed the public function test through several
decisions prior to Flagg Brothers.44 The test provides that governmental
action is present when a private entity exercises "some power delegated to it
by the [government] which is traditionally associated with sovereignty." 4 For
example, a private organization's conducting political elections 46 and a corporation's performance of all necessary municipal functions 47 have been held to
satisfy this test. Conversely, a private utility's supplying a city with electricity

37.

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948).

38. Because this Note is concerned with the fifth amendment, which applies to the federal
government, the phrase "governmental action" will be used instead of the phrase "state action,"
which developed from the Supreme Court cases concerning due process as applied to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974).

39. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-51 (1974); Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715,
721-22 (1961); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
40. See, e.g., CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 115 (1973) ("[T]he line between
private conduct and governmental action cannot be defined by reference to any general formula

unrelated to particular exercises of governmental authority."). See generally Note, State Action:
Theoriesfor Applying ConstitutionalRestrictions to Private Activity, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 656,
656-59 (1974).
41. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); accord, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966)

(city's management and control of a privately owned public park); Public Utilities Comm'n v.
Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (municipal authority specifically approved private railroad company's

broadcast of radio programs on its trolleys and buses).
42.

436 U.S. 149 (1978).

43. 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Although the phrase "symbiotic relationship" was actually first used
by the Supreme Court in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972), Burton is
recognized as having formulated the test, through use of the phrase "position of interdependence,"
to describe the relationship between the government and the private entity. 365 U.S. at 725. The
development of the test is discussed at note 57 infra.
44. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
45. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
46. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); see Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon
v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932).
47. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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has been held not to meet the public function test. 48 The distinguishing factor
is that the public service of supplying electricity has not been a function
traditionally associated with the sovereign.
The Flagg Brothers Court, however, adopted a more restrictive attitude
toward the public function test. The case involved a proposed sale of goods by
the holder of a security interest pursuant to the New York Uniform Commercial Code. 49 The Court held that the state did not delegate nor did the private
entity exercise a public function within the meaning of the test.50 The Court
stressed that the elections and company town cases had in common a "feature
of exclusivity," that is, the elections conducted by the political club were the
only meaningful elections in the county, and the streets owned by the
corporation were the only streets in town."' This exclusivity concept was held
inapplicable in Flagg Brothers5 2 because the parties had other means of
resolving their private dispute.
Flagg Brothers appears to require a strict doctrinal analysis of whether a
certain delegated activity is traditionally a sovereign function. 53 Nevertheless,
the Flagg Brothers Court specifically left open the question of what other
activities might fit the test.- 4 For example, the Court declined to express an
opinion with respect to the private exercise of police functions.5 5 The courts
have yet to apply the Flagg Brothers interpretation to those activities which
the Supreme Court indicated might satisfy the test. Therefore, as discussed
below, it is possible that law enforcement, an aspect of the police function,
will be consistent with the Flagg Brothers interpretation of the public function
test. 56
The public function test coexists with, but is distinguishable from, the
symbiotic relationship test advanced by the Court in Burton and developed by
subsequent decisions. 5 7 A symbiotic relationship is present when two parties
48. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974).
49. 436 U.S. at 151. The proposed sale was to be held under N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKlnney
1964).
50. 436 U.S. at 160-61. The Flagg -Brothers Court relied on language in Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), for its interpretation of the public function test.
436 U.S. at 157.
51. 436 U.S. at 159-60. The Court's mention of streets in a town is a reference to Marsh v.
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), in which a private corporation performed the exclusively
sovereign function of establishing a town.
52. 436 U.S. at 160. The Court's approach has been criticized as "fraught with ambiguities"
and "unduly narrow." See The Supreme Court, 1977 Term, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 57, 120-31 (1978).
The commentator framed the issue as whether the public function exercised by the private party
"is so intimately associated with [the] concept of sovereignty that [the government] ought not be
permitted to authorize its exercise by a private party without the same degree of protection that
would apply if the sovereign itself" exercised the function. Id. at 128.
53. The majority's reasoning was criticized by Justice Marshall, who charged that the
question of what is a traditionally public function was decided in an "historical vacuum." 436
U.S. at 167 (Marshall, J., dissenting); cf. id. at 178 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's
limited examination of delegation of state power).
54. Id. at 163-64.
55. Id. at 163-64 n.14.
56. See notes 77-104 infra and accompanying text.
57. In Burton, a private lessee of a restaurant in a state-owned parking facility discriminated
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rely interdependently upon each other for the effectuation of a common
purpose.5 8 The Supreme Court has not established concrete guidelines for
determining when a symbiotic relationship exists. Thus, application of the test
entails a thorough factual analysis to determine whether such a close connection exists between the government and the private entity that it is appropri-

ate to consider the private entity's action as that of the government itself. 5
The two tests appear to work together. When direct governmental participation is lacking and there is apparently no cooperative interaction between the
government and the private entity, the doctrinal Flagg Brothers approach
would be applied because under such circumstances the only possible manifestation of governmental action is the exercise of a traditionally public function. 60 Conversely, when there is some evidence of cooperation between the
government and the private entity, not only do the courts look to see if the
private entity exercises some public function, 6 1 they also apply the symbiotic
62
relationship test to the government-private entity relationship.
on the basis of race by refusing to serve a black customer. 365 U.S. at 716. The Court held that
this amounted to state action because the benefits mutually conferred by the private lessee and the
parking authority indicated sufficient state participation in the discrimination to invoke constitutional protections. Id. at 724. In Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), the Court
held that racial discrimination practiced by a state-licensed private club operated on private
property did not amount to state action, because the state and the private entity did not share a
symbiotic relationship. Id. at 175. In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), a
privately owned and operated utility company terminated a customer's service without notice or a
hearing. Id. at 347. The Court conceded that the acts of such a heavily regulated quasi-public
entity might be state action in some cases. It held, however, that the utility acted as a private
entity with respect to the specifically challenged acts because the state's regulatory powers were
not directly involved. Id. at 351-52. The Court also noted both the absence of a symbiotic
relationship, id. at 357, and that the utility was not performing a traditionally sovereign function.
Id. at 353. One should not imply from the Flagg Brothers Court's reliance on Jackson, 436 U.S.
at 157, that governmental regulation of a quasi-public entity is a determining factor for whether
there is governmental action. See 419 U.S. at 358.
58. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. at 725.
59. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (citing Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961));
see note 57 supra.
60. See, e.g., Kuczo v. Western Conn. Broadcasting Co., 424 F. Supp. 1325 (D. Conn. 1976),
rev'd, 566 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1977). Although decided before Flagg Brothers, Kuczo is interesting
because it is a harbinger of the Flagg Brothers test. In Kuczo, the feder4l government granted a
radio station a monopoly over the local airways by ensuring that it would be the only station
licensed in the city. The district court held that the station's censorship of political advertising
was governmental action, because of the government's delegation of control over the local
airways to the private entity. 424 F. Supp. at 1328. The Second Circuit reversed, finding no
evidence of either governmental approval of the station's action or interaction between the
government and the station. 566 F.2d at 388. The Second Circuit stated that the existence of a
government-delegated monopoly was relevant, but found that the district court's reliance thereon
was misplaced because the government specifically disapproved of such activity by enacting a
statute prohibiting censorship of political advertising. Id. at 388 n.2. Both courts implicitly
recognized that, absent evidence of cooperation between the state and the private entity, the only
possible means of governmental action is the exercise of a public function. 566 F.2d at 388; 424 F.
Supp. at 1328.
61. When confronted with a factual situation involving both the performance of a public
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B. The NASD Cases
The first case to confront the issue of whether the NASD is a governmental
actor was Harwell v. Growth Programs, Inc. 63 There, NASD members
alleged that the NASD's interpretation of one of its Rules of Fair Practice
without giving notice or a hearing to members was a violation of their due
process rights. 64 The court found no due process violation. 6S In its analysis,
the court concluded that the NASD was a governmental actor, holding that
the NASD exercised governmental authority when it formulated and interpreted rules for its membership. 66 The court asserted that Congress may
validly delegate governmental policy-making power to an administrative
agency, and that the Maloney Amendment had placed the NASD in this
function by the private entity and evidence of governmental involvement, the courts prior to
Flagg Brothers accorded the public function concept a broader definition than did the Flagg
Brothers Court. See, e.g., Robinson v. Price, 553 F.2d 918, 920-21 (5th Cir. 1977) (private entity
performed governmental function of handling welfare-related problems with the active cooperation of the state and local governments); Ginn v. Mathews, 533 F.2d 477, 480-81 (9th Cir. 1976)
(nonprofit corporation administered federal Headstart Program, subject to federal oversight); Do
Malherbe v. International Union of Elevator Constructors Local 8, 438 F. Supp. 1121, 1132
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (union denied an alien the opportunity to participate in an affirmative action
program developed and funded by the government and administered by the union on the
government's behalf).
62. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan
Nat'l Bank, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975) (hotelkeeper took property for nonpayment of rent
pursuant to a state statute), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 928 (1976); Coleman v. Wagner College, 429
F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970) (private college expelled students for violation of rules promulgated by
the college at the behest of the state and required to be filed with the state); cases cited note 61
supra.
63. 315 F. Supp. 1184 (W.D. Tex. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 451 F.2d 240 (5th Cir.
1971), modified per curiam, 459 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876 (1972). In
Harwell, investors instituted a class action for breach of contract against various broker-dealers
and the NASD. The NASD and SEC decided that the particular investment program involved
was harmful to public investors and, "after extensive consultation with and the express approval
of" the SEC, the NASD issued an interpretation barring NASD member securities dealers from
participating in the program. The defendant broker-dealers complied, thus repudiating their
existing contracts with the plaintiff investors. Id. at 1186-87. Plaintiffs argued that the NASD's
action was an interference with their contract, a violation of the antitrust laws, and a violation of
due process of law. The court entered summary judgment against plaintiffs on all claims. Id. at
1192. The Fifth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the district court had not fully considered
certain factual issues and that parties are not always free from liability on contracts that
government regulation renders impossible to perform. 451 F.2d at 244-47.
The issue of the NASD's governmental status has arisen in two nonconstitutional contexts. See
Todd & Co., SEC Freedom of Information Act Release No. 41 (Jan. 20, 1976), reprinted in 8
S.E.C. Docket 1085 (1976) (the NASD is not a federal agency for purposes of the Freedom of
Information Act); Sumner B. Cotzin, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,850 (June 12,
1974), reprinted in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,827, discussed at
note 33 supra.
64. 315 F. Supp. at 1189.
65. Id. at 1189-91. In Todd & Co. v. SEC, 557 F.2d 1008 (3d Cir. 1977), the court reviewed
an NASD disciplinary sanction upheld by the SEC and found that the NASD rules were not
unconstitutionally vague. Although its decision assumes that the NASD is not a governmental
actor, the court did not discuss this issue.
66. 315 F. Supp. at 1192.
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role. 67 Therefore, the court reasoned, the NASD is in effect a congressionally
created regulatory agency.68
The argument that the NASD is a governmental actor for constitutional
purposes was also raised in United States v. Bloom. 69 The Bloom court
rejected Harwell70 and held that the NASD was a private professional
association whose actions could not be constitutionally proscribed. 7' The
Bloom court based its holding upon two findings. First, the court found that
there was no implied private cause of action for violation of NASD rules. The
court reasoned that private causes of action are implied only for violation of
federal regulations; therefore, if no cause of action has been implied for
violation of NASD rules, those rules cannot be federal regulations. 7 2 Second,
the court stated that stock exchanges, the NASD's counterpart in the listed
securities markets, had been held not to be governmental actors. By analogy,
73
the court reasoned that the same holding should apply to the NASD.
Finally, the Bloom court expressed a concern that a holding that the NASD is
a governmental actor would create an unwanted expansion of its regulatory
74
powers.

The inconsistency of these two cases points out the unsettled nature of the
law. In addition, neither Bloom nor Harwell applied the Supreme Court's
tests for governmental action to the activities of the NASD. Moreover, the
7
Harwell court based its holding on a delegation of governmental authorityv. s
In light of Flagg Brothers' restrictive application of the public function test,
this method, as applied to the NASD, may no longer be appropriate.
Therefore, an application of the Supreme Court's tests for governmental
action to the NASD is necessary. This is especially true in light of the
possibility that the NASD can investigate and discipline members without
regard to constitutional strictures.
C.

The Public Function and Symbiotic Relationship Tests
as Applied to the NASD
The public function test should be discussed first because a determination
that the NASD meets Flagg Brothers' strict interpretation of a traditionally
sovereign function obviates the task of "sifting facts and weighing circumstances" 76 required by the symbiotic relationship test. If the public function
test is not met but there is some evidence of government-private entity
interaction and the NASD's performing some public function, governmental
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id. at 1188.
450 F. Supp. 323 (E.D. Pa. 1978), discussed at pt. III infra.

70.

Id.

at 330 n.3.

71. Id. at 329-30.
72. Id. at 329; see notes 90-102 infra and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 329-30; see notes 125-38 infra and accompanying text.
74. Id. at 330. Without elaborating, Judge Newcomer maintained that "it would be difficult
to draw the line" on the extent of the powers self-regulatory bodies would gain if they were
deemed to be governmental. In his opinion, the NASD's purposes would be thwarted by such a
holding. Id.; see note 138 infra and accompanying text.
75. 315 F. Supp. at 1188-91.
76. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
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action may still be found through use of the symbiotic relationship test. This
approach is particularly useful in examining the cooperative relationship
between the SEC and the NASD.
1. The Public Function Test-The NASD's Role in Enforcement of the
Federal Securities Laws
As stated above, the Flagg Brothers Court noted that police protection may
be traditionally a sovereign function within the Court's strict interpretation of
the public function test. 7 7 One aspect of police protection is law enforcement.
If it can be established that the NASD enforces the federal securities laws, one
may argue that such activity will satisfy the public function test as it is further
defined by the courts in the future.
The Maloney Amendment's primary purpose was to provide for the establishment of an organization devoted to developing and enforcing ethical
standards among broker-dealers in the OTC industry. 78 Through the promulgation and enforcement of rules governing members' conduct, the NASD has
significantly achieved this purpose. In addition, however, the NASD has
taken a more active role in the enforcement of federal securities law, a
distinctly legal function.
The extent of the NASD's role in enforcing the securities laws is demonstrated by the power it wields in the OTC market. In accordance with the
duty imposed upon it by the 1934 Act, the NASD enforces compliance with
the provisions of the 1934 Act and all rules and regulations promulgated
thereunder. 79 The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 (1975 Act) 80 extended
this duty to include enforcing compliance not only by members, but also their
associates and employees. 8' A violation of SEC rules and regulations, the
1934 Act, or any other statute under SEC jurisdiction may constitute a
violation of the NASD rule8 2 which requires members to maintain high
standards of professional conduct. 8 3 If the member firm or associate of such
77. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
78. Special Study, supra note 2, at 609.
79. Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(2) (1976).
80. Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 1, 89 Stat. 97 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-80 (1970)). The 1975 Act
made significant changes in the securities industry regulatory structure. The Act ended fixed
commission rates for the public and intrabroker transactions, Securities Exchange Act § 6(e)(1),
15 U.S.C. § 78f(e)(1) (1976), directed the SEC to develop a national market system, id. § lIA(a),
15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a) (1976), and generally strengthened the SEC's oversight authority. See S.
Rep. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 (1975), reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News 179, 200-01 [hereinafter cited as 1975 Senate Report].
81. Securities Exchange Act § 15A(b)(2), 15 U.S.C § 78o-3(b)(2) (1976).
82. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 1, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 2151
(1973) ("A member, in the conduct of his business, shall observe high standards of commercial
honor and just and equitable principles of trade.").
83. See, e.g., Management Financial, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,098
(Feb. 11, 1976), reprinted in 8 S.E.C. Docket 1248 (1976) (NASD disciplinary sanction for
violation of the SEC's net capital rule, 17 C.F.R. 240A.5c3-1 (1978), and §§ 10 and 17 of the
Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-10, -17 (1976)); Joseph Blumenthal, 41 S.E.C. 133
(1962) (NASD disciplinary action against a registered broker-dealer for violation of the Federal
Reserve Board's Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. 220 (1978), and the SEC's net capital rule, 17 C.F.R.
240.15c3-1 (1978)).

19791

NASD

firm is found to have violated this rule, the person or firm may be suspended
or expelled from the NASD. 84 Such a suspension or expulsion must be noted
both on applications for employment as a broker and for registration of firms
with the SEC. 85 In addition, expulsion from the NASD is considered a
statutory disqualification under section 6(c)(2) of the 1934 Act,8 6 thereby
excluding a person or firm from membership in a stock exchange. Therefore,
the NASD, on its own initiative, can banish from the securities industry a
violator of federal law. This power is indicative of the evolution of the
NASD's role in the OTC securities market. Rather than merely attempting to
upgrade ethical standards, the NASD is an essential element in Congress' law
enforcement scheme for the securities industry.
The legislative history of the 1975 Act contains authority to support the
proposition that the NASD's federal law enforcement responsibility is a
delegated public function. The Senate report stated that "[tihe self-regulatory
organizations must exercise governmental-type powers if they are to carry out
their responsibilities under the [1934] Act. When a member violates the Act or
a self-regulatory organization's rules, the organization must be in a position to
impose appropriate penalties or to revoke relevant privileges."8 7 The House
report added: "[I]ndustry organizations [must] exercise delegated governmental
power in order to enforce at their own initiative compliance by members of
the industry with both the legal requirements laid down in the Securities
Exchange Act and ethical standards which go beyond those requirements." 8 8
The SEC's conclusions on the NASD's function further supports this proposition: "[I]n important respects, the self-regulatory body is an official arm or
delegate of governmental power."8 9 In effect, both Congress and the SEC
believed that the NASD must exercise some delegated governmental power in
order to perform its statutory responsibility of assisting in the enforcement of
the federal securities laws and upgrading the industry's ethical standards.
The controversy surrounding implied private causes of action for an NASD
member's violation of the Association's rules is further evidence that the
NASD may be performing a delegated public function. Federal courts have
implied private causes of action for violation of several federal regulations not
containing express remedies when it would be appropriate under the criteria
established by the Supreme Court. 90 Therefore, not all federal regulations will
support an implied private cause of action.
84. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. V, § 1, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) S 2301
(1976).
85. S. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 242.
86. 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c)(2) (1976).
87. 1975 Senate Report, supra note 80, at 24, reprinted in [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 203.
88. H.R_ Rep. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1975) (emphasis added).
89. Special Study, supra note 2, at 723.
90. An implied private cause of action exists for violation of the antifraud provisions of
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and rule 1ob-S, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978),
provided plaintiff investor can show "scienter" on the part of the defendant. Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 212 (1976). Implied liability also exists for violation of the proxy
solicitation requirements of § 14 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976). J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court set forth the
criteria for determining whether a private cause of action will be implied: (1) whether the plaintiff
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Two courts have implied a private cause of action 9 ' for violation of one of
the rules contained in the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice. 92 Recognition of an
implied private right of action for violations of these rules demonstrates that
NASD rules and SEC regulations serve the same purpose. 93 On the other
hand, several courts have refused to recognize an implied cause of action for
violation of NASD rules. 94 These latter courts, however, have not relied upon
a finding that the NASD is not a governmental actor. Rather, they have
determined that, under the established criteria, it would be inappropriate to
imply a cause of action for certain rules. 95 Because the courts uniformly
is a member "of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted"; (2) whether there Is
legislative intent to create or deny such a remedy; (3) whether implying a remedy would be
consistent with statutory purposes; and (4) whether the cause of action is traditionally brought
under state law. Id. at 78.
91. Avern Trust v. Clarke, 415 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 963
(1970); Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678, 683 (D. Wyo. 1975).
92. NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art. III, § 2, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH) 1 2152
(1976). This section, commonly referred to as the "suitability rule," requires the broker to
ascertain whether the investment advice he gives is suitable to the investor's financial condition
and needs. This requirement goes beyond the 1934 Act's abolition of caveat emptor and its
substitution of rules of full disclosure. See S. Jaffe, supra note 2, at 250. Three courts have found
implied liability for violation of the New York Stock Exchange's similar rule, Rule 405,
commonly referred to as the "know your customer rule." Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021, 1041-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), modified, 570 F.2d
38 (2d Cir. 1978); Starkman v. Seroussi, 337 F. Supp. 518, 520-21 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
93. See United States v. Bloom, 450 F. Supp. at 329 (NASD rules that serve as a basis for an
implied private cause of action would be federal regulations in the same sense as SEC
regulations). One commentator has noted that NASD rules encompass the same fiduciary duties
between broker and investor as are provided for in the 1934 Act. Note, Implied Liability for
Violation of Stock Exchange and NASD Rules-After Rolf and Faturik, 9 Loy. Chi. L.J. 685, 689
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Implied Liability]. Another commentator has noted that certain NASD
rules are substitutes for SEC rules and regulations. Lowenfels, Private Enforcement in the
Over-the-CounterSecurities Markets: Implied LiabilitiesBased on NASD Rules, 51 Cornell L.Q.
633, 643, 654 (1966) (hereinafter cited as PrivateEnforcement]. At least one court has recognized
that the self-regulatory system produces rules that amount to substitutes for SEC regulation.
Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817
(1966).
94. Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 183 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
817 (1966); Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1383 (N.D. Tex. 1976); Plunkett v.
Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 890 (D. Conn. 1976). See generally Private
Enforcement, supra note 93; Lowenfels, Implied Liabilities Based Upon Stock Exchange Rules,
66 Colum. L. Rev. 12 (1966); Implied Liability, supra note 93. Several other courts have declined
to discuss the implied cause of action issue because of the availability of another basis for liability.
See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594, 599 (2d Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1978).
95. See, e.g., Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178, 182-83 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Lange v. H. Hentz & Co., 418 F. Supp. 1376, 1381-83 (N.D. Tex.
1976); Plunkett v. Dominick & Dominick, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 885, 889-90 (D. Conn. 1976). The
courts prior to the decision in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), developed tests for implied liability
specifically for violation of NASD and stock exchange rules. The Second Circuit's approach,
devised by Judge Friendly in Colonial, looks to the degree of specificity of the given rule upon
which the private claim is based, and whether it plays an integral part in the total scheme of
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employ these criteria in their analyses, there is an implicit recognition that,
although not all NASD rules support an implied cause of action, they may
96
serve the same purposes that federal regulations serve.
97
The Bloom court briefly discussed this issue, citing Lange v. H. Hentz &
Co., 98 in which the court did not imply a cause of action for violation of an
NASD rule. The Bloom court reasoned that NASD rules cannot be federal
regulations in the same sense as SEC regulations, because they cannot support
an implied cause of action. The court interpreted language in Lange that the
NASD is a private association99 to be the basis upon which the Lange court
decided the issue. 100 The language to which Bloom referred, however,
precedes the Lange court's extensive analysis of the criteria necessary to imply
a cause of action. 101 Thus, contrary to the Bloom court's interpretation,
Lange's holding is not based upon a finding that the NASD is a private
association, but specifically upon a finding that the NASD rules in issue do
not meet the implied cause of action criteria established by the Supreme Court
and the federal courts.1 0 2 In addition, the Bloom court did not discuss any of
the other decisions that have dealt with private causes of action for violation
of NASD rules.
Because the parameters of the public function test remain somewhat
amorphous, what constitutes a traditionally public function cannot easily be
ascertained. Enforcement of securities law is certainly an important governmental function, and may be a traditionally public function within the Flagg
Brothers Court's interpretation of the test. 10 3 Of course, if traditional is

interpreted to mean what was considered a public function at the time of the
inception of the Republic, securities regulation would not satisfy the test.
Nevertheless, it is apparent that Congress gave the NASD the equivalent of
governmental power to enforce federal law because it recognized that the
purposes of the 1934 Act could not otherwise be effectuated.10 4 In addition,
some courts, by their recognition that certain NASD regulations serve the
same purpose as federal regulations, have appreciated this need. Therefore, it
securities regulation. 358 F.2d at 182. A slight variation was proposed by the Seventh Circuit,
which determines whether the rule was designed for the direct protection of investors. Buitrey v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
838 (1969). The Plunkett court relied upon Colonial, 414 F. Supp. at 889-90, and the Lange court
applied the criteria established by Cort, Colonial, and Buttrey. 418 F. Supp. at 1381-83. For a
discussion of the Cort test, see note 90 supra.
96. See Private Enforcement, supra note 93, at 643, 654.
97. 450 F. Supp. at 329.
98. 418 F. Supp. 1376 (N.D. Tex. 1976). For a critical analysis of Lange, see Note, Securities
Regulation-Lange v. H. Hentz & Co.-The Implication of a Private Remedy for Violations of
the NASD Rules of FairPractice, 3 J. Corp. L. 386 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Implication).
99. 418 F. Supp. at 1379.
100. 450 F. Supp. at 329.
101. 418 F. Supp. at 1381-83.
102. Id. at 1383. One commentator has suggested that to imply a private remedy for
members' violations of the NASD rules would limit the necessity for greater regulation by the
SEC, thereby avoiding the creation of an even larger bureaucracy. Implication, supro note 98, at
395-96. Indeed, containing the size of the federal bureaucracy was a motivating factor for the
establishment of the NASD. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 44-55 supra and accompanying text.
104. See notes 87-88 supra and accompanying text.
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is arguable that the NASD, to some extent, performs a traditionally public
function when it does the work that the SEC would otherwise have to do in
the OTC securities industry.
2.

Applicability of the Symbiotic Relationship Doctrine-Governmental
Involvement

The preceding section indicates that the NASD does perform certain
governmental functions. When there is evidence of governmental involvement
in the challenged action of an entity that exercises some governmental
function, the courts have applied the symbiotic relationship test for governmental action. 10 5 Thus, it is appropriate to examine the pervasiveness of
governmental involvement in NASD activities to determine whether a symbiotic relationship exists between it and the federal government-specifically
the SEC.
The legislative history of the 1975 Act demonstrates that Congress intended
a close relationship between the SEC and the NASD. According to the Senate
committee which drafted the bill: "Industry regulation and government
regulation are not alternatives, but complementary components of the selfregulatory process. [The 1934 Act established] a unique pattern of regulation
combining both industry and government responsibility .... The Committee
concurs in the need to emphasize the mutual regulatory responsibilities of the
industry and the SEC.' 0 6 In the same vein, the SEC concluded its major
study of securities self-regulation by asserting that "[the relationship between
the Commission and the self-regulatory organizations has at times been
referred to as a 'partnership' or 'cooperative regulation.' Under either expression the roles of the Commission and the self-regulatory agencies are essentially complementary ....
That relationship was strengthened by the 1975 Act, which increased the
SEC's involvement in NASD rulemaking actions, 0 8 made explicit the SEC's
ability to sanction the NASD for failing to enforce its own rules,10 9 and
expanded the SEC's authority to compel the NASD to enforce compliance by
its members with the securities laws and the Association's rules."10 Thus, it
appears that Justice Douglas' observation needs updating-the SEC has
emerged from behind the door with guns blazing."'
105.

See cases cited notes 61-62 supra.

106. 1975 Senate Report, supra note 80, at 22-23, reprintedin [1975] U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 201. The committee added: "[T]he industry and the government (do not] fulfill the same
function in the regulatory framework or .. .enjoy the same order of authority .... The
self-regulatory organizations exercise authority subject to SEC oversight. They have no authority
to regulate independently of the SEC's control." Id.
107.

Special Study, supra note 2, at 723.

108. See Securities Exchange Act § 19(b), (c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b),.(c) (1976), discussed at
notes 113-14 infra and accompanying text.
109. Id. § 19(h), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h) (1976), discussed at note 115 infra and accompanying
text.
110. Section 19(g)(2) makes it an affirmative duty of the NASD to comply with and enforce
compliance by members with the 1934 Act and the Association's own rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(g)(2)
(1976). Section 21(e)(2) allows the SEC to apply to a federal district court for an order compelling
the NASD to enforce compliance by its members or associated persons. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e)(2)
(1976).
111. See note 20 supra and accompanying text.
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In order to satisfy the symbiotic relationship test, the Supreme Court
requires not only the existence of a cooperative relationship between the
government and the private entity, but also a showing that the government
has "insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the [private
entity such that it is] a joint participant in the enterprise." ' 2 It is submitted
that such joint participation does exist between the NASD and the SEC. For
example, although the NASD can promulgate its own rules, the SEC must
approve each rule." 3 In addition, the Commission may "abrogate, add to,
and delete from" the NASD's rules.'1 4 If the SEC takes such action, the
amended rule becomes an NASD rather than an SEC rule. Moreover, a
failure by the NASD to enforce its own rules may result in an SEC
sanction.' 15 Therefore, the NASD is compelled by the SEC to enforce not
only the rules it has promulgated but also those created by the SEC. Finally,
any disciplinary action taken by the NASD is appealable as of right by6 the
person aggrieved and is reviewable by the SEC on its own motion."
One court has held that when a state requires a private entity to promulgate
rules and have them approved by state authorities, governmental action may
be present. In Coleman v. Wagner College,"17 New York State required
private universities to adopt disciplinary codes for the control of campus
demonstrations and to file those codes with the state." 8 The court suggested
that the following factors were indications of governmental action: first,
whether state officials had authority to reject regulations of which they did
not approve; second, whether those officials participated in formulating the
regulations' content; and third, whether university officials held a reasonable
belief that the state intended them to adopt a particular stance toward student
demonstrators." 9 The first two Coleman factors indicate governmental action
is present with the NASD. First, all NASD rules submitted by the NASD
must be approved by the SEC.' 20 Second, the SEC may amend or abrogate
NASD rules and write rules that the NASD must adopt as its own. 12 1 As for
Coleman's third factor, each situation would have to be analyzed to determine
the extent of the NASD officials' "reasonable beliefs." It is reasonable to
assume that because the NASD is subject to SEC control, it would likely
accede to SEC demands when the two organizations conflict on policy
determination.
The Coleman decision is significant for another reason. In his concurring
opinion, Judge Friendly observed that because the state benefitted from the
colleges' action, it would have to accept responsibility for preventing over112.

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357-S8 (1974).

113. Securities and Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1976). Prior to the 1975 Act, no
such approval was required.
114. Securities and Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1976).
115. Section 19(h) permits the SEC to suspend or revoke the NASD's registration, censure the
NASD, or impose limitations upon its operations. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(h)(1) (1976).
116. Id. § 19(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2) (1976). The SEC may affirm, modify, set aside, or
remand the disciplinary action. Id. § 19(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(e)(1) (1976).
117. 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970).
118. Id. at 1125.
119. Id.
120. See note 113 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
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zealous conduct on the part of those colleges.1 22 Judge Friendly stated that
government cannot undermine constitutional restraints by using a private
entity to pursue governmental policies, and that under such circumstances
governmental action can be found. 12 3 Applying Judge Friendly's reasoning to
the NASD, one may argue that the SEC should not be permitted to underthat apply to its actions by using the NASD
mine the constitutional restraints
2 4
to carry out its objectives.1
An additional argument for finding that NASD action is governmental
action is the NASD's similarity to the other major self-regulatory organizations, the national stock exchanges. Several courts have held that the stock
exchanges are governmental actors and that, therefore, exchange disciplinary
proceedings and exchange actions that involve the impairment of substantial
rights are subject to the strictures of constitutional due process. 2 ' The
following instances of "intimate" government involvement between the exchanges and the SEC, each of which is equally applicable to the NASD, have
influenced these courts: first, stock exchanges must register with the SEC;
second, their rules are subject to amendment or change by the SEC; third,
their members are closely regulated by the SEC; fourth, each may be suspended or its registration withdrawn by the SEC; 126 and fifth, their power to
conduct disciplinary proceedings is conferred upon them by the SEC. 127
Despite the numerous similarities between the NASD and the exchanges,' 28
122. 429 F.2d at 1126 (Friendly, J., concurring).
123. Id. (Friendly, J., concurring).
124. Judge Friendly also noted the importance of the disciplinary codes' symbolic effect,
which he asserted was the rationale of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
429 F.2d at 1127 (Friendly, J., concurring). He stated that, even if the government does not
direct a private entity's particular act, if it has placed the private entity in a position such that it
is reasonable for the person affected to believe that the government authorized the act,
governmental action may be found. Id. (Friendly, J., concurring). Application of that consideration to the NASD would require courts faced with the issue of whether NASD action Is
governmental to determine if it reasonably appeared that the SEC authorized a particular NASD
act. For example, in the event the NASD and the SEC jointly pursue an investigation of an
NASD member, it might well appear that the NASD's acts are in fact the SEC's acts. Indeed, the
defendants' allegations of government misconduct in Bloom were directed at both the NASD and
the SEC. 450 F. Supp. at 328-32. Hornblower's supervisor testified that, in his belief, tlhe SEC
and the NASD actively cooperated in a joint investigation. Id. at 331. Although the Bloom court
dismissed this testimony as not credible, such assertions, if true, might support a constitutional
challenge of NASD action under Judge Friendly's reasoning.
125. See Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 940-43 (5th
Cir. 1971) (delisting proceeding), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); Villani v. New York Stock
Exch., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (disciplinary proceeding), qff'd sub
nom. Sloan v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1973); Crimmins v. American
Stock Exch., Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (disciplinary proceeding). Relying
upon Burton, the Intercontinentalcourt found that the Exchange's intimate involvement with the
SEC brought it "within the purview of the Fifth Amendment controls over governmental due
process." 452 F.2d at 941 (footnote omitted).
126. Intercontinental Indus., Inc. v. American Stock Exch., 452 F.2d 935, 941 n.9 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972).
127. Villani v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1188 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972),
aff'd sub nom. Sloan v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 489 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1973).
128. See Special Study, supra note 2, at 504-06, 602-03; notes 15-21 supra and accompanying
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the Bloom court refused to hold that NASD actions are governmental. 2 9 It
relied on United States v. Solomon,130 interpreting it as holding that the
exchanges are not governmental and,
therefore, cannot be held responsible for
31
violations of constitutional rights.1
In Solomon, an officer of a New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) member
firm had testified before the NYSE regarding financial irregularities discovered in his firm's accounts. Solomon incriminated himself at the hearing, and
a transcript was forwarded to the SEC pursuant to a subpoena. Subsequently,
he was indicted and convicted of violating certain recordkeeping and reporting regulations promulgated by the SEC.1 32 On appeal, the defendant claimed
that the NYSE had violated his fifth amendment right against selfincrimination. The court held that the privilege against self-incrimination is
not available to those who testify at a stock exchange investigatory proceed133
ing.
The Solomon court based its holding on three considerations. First, when
the NYSE compelled members to testify at its proceedings, it did not act on
behalf of the SEC. 134 Second, if the privilege against self-incrimination was
made available to persons testifying before exchanges, it would lead to its
application to self-policing organizations in other industries, thereby depriving
those organizations of their .one effective investigative device, removal from
the organization for refusal to answer questions. 13s Finally, acceptance of
defendant's argument would enable the NYSE, and other similar organizations, to grant immunity from future use of compelled testimony "without any
weighing of the need for the evidence against the undesirability of conferring
36
an immunity. . and without the supervision of the Attorney General."'
In relying on Solomon, the Bloom court ignored the fact that the Solomon
court expressly limited its decision to the fifth amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination: "We need not here decide whether stock exchanges may be
text. Congress enacted the 1975 Act to, among other things, preserve and improve self-regulation
by strengthening the "total regulatory fabric." 1975 Senate Report, supra note 80, at 23. The 1975
Act treats the exchanges and the NASD equally in several respects: (11 eligibility for registration
by the organization with the SEC; (2) procedures covering rule promulgation, conduct of
disciplinary proceedings, and eligibility for membership; (3) direct SEC sanctions of members or
persons associated with members; and (4) SEC-enforced compliance with an organization's rules
or regulations or with 1934 Act provisions if the self-regulatory organization fails to enforce such
provisions. Id. at 22-36.
129. 450 F. Supp. at 330.
130. 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
131. 450 F. Supp. at 328.
132. 509 F.2d at 865.
133. Id. at 867. The court also considered the issue of whether the defendant's testimony was
in fact compelled by the NYSE. The court held that the witness' statements were voluntary
because the penalty the NYSE would prescribe if he refused to appear and testify was uncertain.
Id. at 872; cf, Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (police officers questioned during
investigation into corruption were told that if they refused to answer, they would be fired).
134. 509 F.2d at 869.
135. Id. at 869-70.
136. Id. at 870. The court noted the public policy consideration that certain constitutional
provisions, such as the privilege against self-incrimination, "are incapable of violation by anyone
except government in the narrowest sense." Id. at 867.
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subject to some due process requirements for certain types of action . ... We
deal here with special factors concerning the privilege against selfincrimination . . . -137 From this statement and the court's three considerations, it is apparent that Solomon held that the privilege against selfincrimination involves special factors that militate against making it available
in a proceeding of a self-regulatory body. The Bloom court incorrectly
interpreted Solomon to mean that constitutional guarantees never apply to
stock exchange proceedings.
Finally, the Bloom court also interpreted Solomon as evidencing a concern
that, if self-regulatory bodies were held governmental for constitutional purposes, it would expand their regulatory powers.1 38 The court apparently
misunderstood the effect of characterizing the NASD as a governmental actor.
Indeed, the effect of holding NASD action to be governmental action is to
constrict rather than to expand its governmental authority. As a governmental
actor, the NASD will be prevented from exercising its powers in ways
inimical to basic constitutional provisions.
In conclusion, the realities of the self-regulatory scheme established by
Congress for the OTC securities industry suggest that the NASD's investigative and disciplinary activities meet the constitutional tests for governmental
action. Although the SEC has overall responsibility for enforcing the securities laws, the NASD plays an essential role in the regulatory scheme. The
NASD's law enforcement duties demonstrate that its function is to police the
OTC industry, an activity that may satisfy the public function test. In
addition, because of its interaction with the SEC, NASD activities meet the
symbiotic relationship test. The legislative history and the SEC's own observations support the conclusion that the government has insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with the NASD. Finally, because the NASD's
operations and responsibilities are so substantially similar to the exchanges',
they should be treated the same way for constitutional purposes.
III.

APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO A
SEARCH CONDUCTED BY AN

NASD

MEMBER

In Bloom, the court also faced the issue of whether the fourth amendment's
exclusionary rule139 should apply to a private search conducted by an NASD
137.
138.

Id. at 871.
450 F. Supp. at 330. Here again, the Bloom court's interpretation is questionable

because Solomon was limited to the problem of endowing such organizations with the power to
grant use immunity. 509 F.2d at 870.
139.

Although the fourth amendment itself does not speak of a remedy in the event of a

violation, the Supreme Court has held that evidence seized during a search that violates the
amendment is inadmissable in state and federal criminal prosecutions. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) (state prosecution); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (federal prosecution).

The exclusionary rule has not escaped criticism. See, e.g., People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150
N.E. 585, 587 (Cardozo, J.) ("The criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered."),
cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926). Nevertheless, because of its value as a deterrent to "future
unlawful police conduct," the exclusionary rule has remained intact. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.

465, 484 (1976). For an analysis of the development of and the controversy surrounding the
exclusionary rule, as well as its validity in the future, see Comment, Reason and the Fourth
Amendment-The Burger Court and the Exclusionary Rule, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 139 (1977).
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member firm. In general, the exclusionary rule applies to searches conducted
by government officials.1 40 Nevertheless, a private search comes within the
scope of the fourth amendment if it is conducted for a public purpose or is
governmentally motivated. 14 No court other than Bloom has faced this issue
in a securities self-regulatory context. Several courts, however, have attempted to determine whether the circumstances of a particular private search
42
converted it into a government search.'
In Bloom, an NASD member broker-dealer, Hornblower and Weeks,
Hemphill-Noyes, Inc., terminated two of its securities salesmen without
allowing them to clear out their desks.' 4 3 After they had left the office, a
Hornblower supervisor searched their desks and confiscated certain personal
papers and records. Shortly thereafter, Hornblower notified the NASD of the
terminations and the NASD began its own investigation of the firings,
requesting that Hornblower turn over relevant information. Hornblower
forwarded copies of papers taken from the salesmen's desks to the NASD.
These materials were eventually passed on to the SEC and used in the
criminal prosecution of the defendants.' 4 At trial, the Bloom defendants
moved to suppress the evidence obtained from their desks on the ground that
Hornblower's search violated their fourth amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure. The court denied their motion, holding that the
4S
firm's actions were purely private and without governmental influence .
The defendants in Bloom based their fourth amendment argument on a
contention that the search of their desks was governmentally motivated. After
examining the facts for evidence of governmental motivation, the court
concluded that Hornblower conducted the search to protect itself from the
140.

Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921); see United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433,

455 n.31 (1976); United States v. Jackson, 578 F.2d 1162, 1163 (5th Cir. 1978).
141. See, e.g., Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d I (9th Cir. 1966). In Corngold, customs

agents suspected contraband in certain packages and asked an airline employee if he wished to
open the packages. The airline employee opened the packages with the agents' assistance. The
court held that the private search was subject to the exclusionary rule because it was "conducted
solely in aid of the enforcement of a federal statute." Id. at 5; accord, Knoll Associates, Inc. v.
FTC, 397 F.2d 530, 535 (7th Cir. 1968) (private party stole defendant's documents on behalf of
the government for use in a pending proceeding); United States v. Stein, 322 F. Supp. 346, 348
(N.D. Ill. 1971) (government encouraged private party to seize defendant's records and turn them
over to prosecutors).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Freeland, 562 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
957 (1977); United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1328 (5th Cir. 1975). Because each case presents a new factual context,

the courts have emphasized different factors in reaching their conclusions. See United States v.
Jackson, 578 F.2d 1162,

1163 (5th Cir. 1978) (exclusionary rule did not apply because the

government did not have prior knowledge of the search); United States v. McDaniel, 574 F.2d
1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1978) (privately motivated search is not subject to the exclusionary rule);
United States v. Fannon, 536 F.2d 961, 963 (9th Cir. 1977) (private search authorized by a

federal statute is subject to the exclusionary rule); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 4 (9th
Cir. 1966) (a search conducted solely to assist enforcement of federal law is subject to the
exclusionary rule).

143. The terminations followed customer complaints that the two might be involved in illegal
stock manipulation. 450 F. Supp. at 326.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 327-28.
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administrative penalties and civil liabilities it could face if it were found guilty
of lax supervision of its employees. 146 Although the court conceded that the
searches aided law enforcement, it reasoned that Hornblower acted to protect
no statute or regulation specifically required it to search the
itself because
147
desks.
One may criticize the Bloom court's analysis on several grounds. The court
decided the fourth amendment question before it discussed the issue of
whether the NASD was a governmental actor. 148 Thus, the court reached its
decision to admit the evidence without considering whether an organization
that is at least arguably governmental exercised any form of influence over
Hornblower which could have motivated the search. 149 Subsequently, the
court held that the NASD's actions were not governmental. As discussed
above, because NASD investigative and disciplinary activities satisfy the
Supreme Court's tests for governmental action,' 50 the Bloom court should
have concluded that the NASD is a governmental actor.
A finding of governmental status would have an effect on the applicability
of the fourth amendment because it would allow a court to consider certain
additional factors that the Bloom court did not discuss. For instance, NASD
member firms must promptly notify the NASD of the termination of any
employees who are registered representatives,' 5' which the Hornblower employees were. At that point, in accordance with its statutorily mandated and
SEC-enforced responsibility as a self-regulatory organization, the NASD
would generally conduct its own investigation. 15 2 This is especially true in
cases such as Bloom, which involve allegations of fraud and stock manipulation. In Bloom, the NASD did conduct such an investigation, and asked
Hornblower to forward to the NASD "any relevant information" in its
possession. Hornblower knew that if it did not comply with this request it
would violate the Rules of Fair Practice, S3 thereby exposing itself to suspension or expulsion from the NASD, and possible loss of the right to participate
in the securities industry. 5 4 Because the NASD's role in securities law
enforcement is governmental, it appears that Hornblower's search was at least
in part governmentally motivated.
The Bloom court further concluded that Hornblower conducted the search
to protect itself from possible civil and administrative liabilities.' 5 One may
question the court's reasoning because, if in fact the firm was responsible for
the employees' wrongdoing, its searching of the desks after the wrongdoing
had occurred could not have protected the firm from any future liabilities.
Therefore, because the search could not have aided Hornblower's private
interest of avoiding future liability, its primary effect was to aid law enforce146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See
149. Id.

at 326-28.
at 327-28.
id. at 326-28.
at 327 n.1.

150. See pt. II supra.
1625 (1978).
151. NASD Bylaws, art. XV, § 5, reprinted in NASD Manual (CCH)
152. See notes 109-15 supra and accompanying text.
153. See, e.g., Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217 (1960i (SEC review of NASD disciplinary
proceeding which found a violation of art. I, § 3 of the Rules of Fair Practice).
154. See notes 82-86 supra and accompanying text.
155. 450 F. Supp. at 327-28.
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ment by uncovering evidence eventually used in a criminal prosecution. As
such, the purpose of the search would appear to be public rather than private.
The holding in Bloom creates a potential for abuse by the NASD of the
investigatory powers given to it by Congress. For example, under Bloom an
NASD official can request one of its member firms to assist an NASD
investigation by searching the desks of its employees. The same request by an
SEC official would violate the employees' fourth amendment rights. Moreover, the exigent circumstances that might justify a warrantless search are not
present in a case such as Bloom. 15 6 Assuming probable cause, there is ample
time for the member firm to inform the proper authorities and obtain a
warrant so that it may lawfully conduct its search.
CONCLUSION
The NASD performs a delegated public function by enforcing compliance
with both its own rules and the federal securities laws. The SEC's pervasive
oversight and active intervention in NASD operations demonstrates that a
symbiotic relationship exists between it and the NASD. In short, the NASD
plays an integral role in the regulatory mechanism of the OTC securities
market. As such, the NASD carries heavy constitutional responsibilities. As
the facts of Bloom demonstrate, fundamental constitutional guarantees may
be undermined as long as the NASD is permitted to act in a governmental
manner beyond the boundaries of constitutional limitations. Thus, the NASD
should be subject to the fifth amendment's prohibition against arbitrary and
capricious governmental acts. Moreover, the fourth amendment's exclusionary rule should be made applicable to an NASD member firm's search and
seizure of employee's personal property when the evidence suggests that the
search was motivated by NASD procedures and carried out for the public
purpose of assisting law enforcement.
Vincent L. Briccetti
156. For a discussion of the circumstances that might validate a warrantless search, see
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-76 (1971).

